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Until recently, the question of whether § 43 of the Lanham Act prevented
the unaccredited copying of an un-copyrighted work was an open one.
However, in Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox, the United States Supreme
Court speaks directly on this issue, emphasizing the distinction between
copyright and trademark protections and cautioning against “misuse or
overextension” of trademark protections into areas traditionally covered by
copyright or patent law. This iBrief assesses the importance of such line
drawing and explores the implications of this decision.

BACKGROUND
¶1

In Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether § 43(a) of the

Lanham Act,2 which makes unlawful any false designation of the origin of goods, prevents the unaccredited
copying of an un-copyrighted work.3 In this case, the “work” in question was a video series about the allied
campaign of World War II. In 1948, General Dwight D. Eisenhower completed his book, Crusade in Europe,
an account of the allied crusade of World War II, which was published by Doubleday.4 Doubleday registered
it with the Copyright Office in 1948 and thereafter granted exclusive television rights to an affiliate of
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation (“Fox”).5 Fox arranged for Time, Inc. (“Time”) to produce a
television series based on the book, using the same title, “Crusade in Europe,” and Time assigned its
copyrights in the series to Fox.6 The Time series combined a soundtrack incorporating a narration of the book
with film footage from the U.S. Army, Navy, Coast Guard, the National Film Board of Canada, and
unidentified “Newsreel Pool Cameramen.”7 In 1975, Doubleday renewed the copyright on its book; however,
Fox neglected to renew the copyright on its television series, which expired in 1977.8 In 1988, Fox reacquired
the television rights in the book, including the exclusive right to distribute the Crusade television series on
video and to sub-license this capability to others.9 SFM Entertainment (“SFM”) and New Line Home Video,
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Inc. (“New Line”) acquired from Fox the exclusive rights to manufacture and distribute “Crusade in Europe”
on video.10
¶2

In 1995, Dastar purchased eight beta cam tapes of the original version of the Crusade television

series, which was in the public domain because Fox’s copyrights had expired in 1977. Dastar then copied
them and edited the series into a new video set titled “World War II Campaigns.”11 Dastar’s Campaigns
series is approximately half as long as the Crusade series, and Dastar made changes to the original series, such
as substituting a new opening sequence, credit page and final closing, in addition to removing all references to
and images of Doubleday’s book.12 The Campaigns series makes no reference to the Crusade series, New
Line’s Crusade videotapes, or the book.13 After making these changes, Dastar sold the Campaigns series as
its own product.14
¶3

In 1998, respondents Fox, SFM, and New Line brought an action against Dastar, alleging in their

amended complaint that the sale of the Campaigns video set: (1) infringed upon Doubleday’s copyright in the
Eisenhower book and therefore also upon the exclusive television rights in the book, (2) constituted reverse
passing off in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act because the video set was sold without proper credit to
the Crusade television series,15 and (3) violated state unfair competition law.16 The District Court found in
favor of respondents on all three counts, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment
for respondents on the Lanham Act claim, but reversed as to the copyright claim and remanded.17 The Court
of Appeals said nothing with regard to the state unfair competition claim.18

SUPREME COURT TAKES A FIRM STANCE
¶4

Copyright and trademark laws stem from different sources within the Constitution, and their goals are

distinct. Copyright law stems from the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution, in which Congress is
granted the authority “to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”19 In contrast,
trademark law originates in the Commerce Clause, and has “no necessary relation to invention or
discovery.”20 The Intellectual Property Clause “reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation
and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any advance in the ‘Progress of Science
10
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and Useful Arts.”21 As the Court pointed out in Bonito Boats, Congress has considered extending copyright
protection, but has refused; it is up to Congress to decide if the present system is ineffectual at promoting the
useful arts.22 The Court has consistently held that, as is the case with patents, “the overriding purpose of
providing a reward for authors’ creative activity is to motivate that activity and to allow the public access to
the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”23
¶5

In Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox, the Supreme Court strengthened the distinction between

copyright and trademark; in fact, it rendered this distinction unmistakably clear. The Court categorically
rejected Fox’s claim that Dastar had violated their rights by reverse passing off, and declared that the Lanham
Act does not protect against unaccredited copying of an un-copyrighted work in the public domain.24 In the
past, plaintiffs have occasionally attempted to invoke § 43(a) as an alternative method to safeguarding their
attribution rights.25 Seeing this as an opportunity for clarification in the area of intellectual property, the
Supreme Court cautioned against the misuse or overextension of trademark protections into areas traditionally
occupied by copyright and patent law.

The Court’s reasoning was based on two elements: 1) its

determination that the most appropriate definition of “origin of goods” is be limited to the origin of tangible
goods offered for sale and not to the author of ideas and concepts, and 2) underlying legal principles in
copyright, patent, and trademark law. The trademark statute in question here, the Lanham Act, makes
“actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks” and is meant “to protect persons engaged in…
commerce against unfair competition.”26 The Court began its discussion by noting that while the Lanham Act
is “one of the few provisions that goes beyond trademark protection,” § 43 “does not have boundless
application as a remedy for unfair trade practices,” setting the cautionary tone of the decision early on. 27

1. Defining “Origin of Goods”
¶6

Respondents based their claims on § 43(a), which prevents the “false designation of origin, or false or

misleading descriptions of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . is likely to cause
confusion . . . as to the origin . . . of [its goods].”28 As a natural consequence, much of the reasoning of the
Court turned on its chosen interpretation of the phrase “origin of goods.”29 The Court held that because
copyright and patent laws, not common law foundations, were designed to protect originality and creativity,
21
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the logical conclusion is that “the phrase refers to the producer of tangible goods for sale, and not to the
author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods.”30 To hold otherwise, the Court
continued, “would be akin to finding that § 43(a) created a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which
Congress may not do.”31 In its brief, Fox claims their action against Dastar does not implicate any broader
questions about the duration of copyright.32 The Court disagreed, concluding that under its definition of
“origin of goods,” Dastar was the “origin” of the series it sold as its own, and therefore Fox and respondents
could not prevail on their Lanham Act claim.33 The Court felt that any other interpretation would not be in
accordance with the foundations of copyright and trademark law; in addition, alternative readings would pose
serious practical attribution problems, such as ensuring proper credit to all originators, and avoiding the false
impression that credited originators actually approve of or sponsor the repackaged product.34 The Court
concluded that “without a copyrighted work as a base point, the word ‘origin’ has no discernable limits.”35
¶7

The Court therefore decided upon a more narrow interpretation of the phrase than Fox and the other

respondents had hoped.36 This statement has already been criticized by some, who complain that “merely
requiring a few words of attribution for works subject to expired copyrights does not render them unexpired
or create a species of perpetual copyright.”37 As will be discussed, this decision has important and serious
implications.

2. The “Carefully Crafted Bargain:” Underlying Legal Principles in Copyright, Patent, and
Trademark Law
¶8

The Court used its decision as an opportunity to reiterate that the rights of copyright holders (like

those of patentees) are part of a “carefully crafted bargain,” under which the public may use the work (or
invention) at will once the copyright or patent has expired.38 While copyrights (and patent rights) expire
before falling into the public domain - regardless of use or nonuse by owner - trademarks do not terminate so
long as the user continues to use them and maintain proper registration.39 Emphasizing the importance of this
underlying legal principle, the Court restated its position (articulated in earlier decisions), that as part of this
“bargain,” the right to copy, and to copy without attribution, passes to the public once a copyright has
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expired.40

This carefully crafted bargain, envisioned by the framers of the Constitution, would be

jeopardized, if not nullified, in the event that trademark law was able to infringe upon it.
¶9

The Court pointed out that by preventing competitors from copying a “source identifying mark,”

trademark law is meant to reduce the customer's cost of shopping and making purchasing decisions, while
helping to reassure the producer that it will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a
desirable product.41 The Court stressed that the Lanham Act does not exist to reward manufacturers for their
innovation in creating a particular device; because that is the purpose of patent law and its period of
exclusivity.42 Again, the Court turned to the foundations of intellectual property laws, pointing to the fact that
while the copyright and patent laws were created to protect originality and creativity, the Lanham Act was
not.43

IMPLICATIONS
¶10

Though Fox and the other respondents may be disappointed with the loss of a $1.6 million award by

the trial court (and affirmed by the Court of Appeals), they may not be entirely without remedy. Left
undecided by the Supreme Court is the question of whether Dastar’s work infringes on the copyrights held on
the Crusade book. The book copyright issue is still in litigation (as the Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded the copyright claim), and the Supreme Court made no decision on whether Dastar’s product would
infringe a valid copyright in the Crusade book. Additionally, Fox had the opportunity to prevent this situation
from happening in the first place. Had it renewed the copyright in the Crusade television series, it would have
had “an easy claim of copyright infringement.”44 In the word of one commentator: “In the end, the Supreme
Court prevented Fox from getting relief through the Lanham Act back door when it could not get through the
copyright front door that was shut through Fox’s own mistake or inadvertence in 1977, when the copyrighted
work was prematurely dedicated to the public domain.”45
¶11

For Fox, as well as the other respondents in this case, a lesson may have been learned the hard way.

For others in similar positions, this case can serve instead as a warning, putting authors, producers, and
creators on notice of what protections will and will not be available to them; more specifically, this case
warns of the consequences should one neglect to renew their copyright. Undeniably, the Dastar opinion is not
a revolutionary one, but it is important nonetheless. It does not attempt to redefine the existing landscape of
intellectual property law, but rather it clarifies the distinctions that already exist within that landscape. The
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Court used this opinion to highlight the important distinction between copyright and trademark laws; it was
rightfully concerned that allowing the line to blur in a case such as this would create a state of “perpetual
copyright protection” that could nullify the intent and effect of copyright and trademark law.46 The Court
took similar opportunities to address the distinction between patent and trademark law in Wal-Mart, TrafFix,
and Bonito Boats.47 In each of the cases, the Court looked to the legislative intent in creating patent and
trademark laws, emphasizing the idea that free and legal copying is an essential element of competition, and
explaining that “legally protected zones of exclusive rights, such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights, are
exceptions to a general rule of free copying and imitation.”48

CONCLUSION
¶12

Dastar v. Fox clarifies the distinctions existing within the broad realm of intellectual property law and

provides creators with adequate notice as to what protections they will be afforded. The Supreme Court
spoke clearly to clarify the relationship between copyright and trademark law, cautioning against an extension
of trademark law into an area covered by copyright law. Understanding this relationship is of great value to
writers, artists, and creators; for Fox and the other respondents in this case, that understanding came at a price
of $1.6 million.
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